to the effect that one tax is more progressive than another are frequently made. but seldom explained.
Introduction
In discussions of tax policy one frequently finds one tax described as 'more progressive' than another. Sometimes the basis of the progressivity comparison is clearly specified, but more usually it is not. Since the assessment of relative progressivity typically revolves around the distributional implications of taxation, it is the basis of the underlying distributional judgements which remains vague. The concept of Lorenz domination underlies the approach to progressivity comparisons adopted in this paper. [See Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) for discussion of the welfare implications and other aspects of the Lorenz criterion for inequality comparisons.] One tax will be described as 'more progressive' than another for a given distribution of pre-tax income if and only if the Lorenz curve of the distribution of post-tax income to which the more progressive tax gives rise lies everywhere on or inside that associated with the less progressive tax. If and only if one tax is more progressive than another for all distributions of pre-tax income, it will be described as 'uniformly more progressive'.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the use of a single-crossing condition on suitably normalized tax schedules in progressivity comparisons, and to suggest a general framework for statements on relative progressivity. The single-crossing condition is discussed in section 2, where it is shown that *We are grateful to John Kay, Peter Lambert, Kevin Roberts and especially David Ulph for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. the condition may be used to infer a partial ordering of distributions of posttax income by the Lorenz criterion. To this partial ordering will correspond a ranking of taxes by progressivity. ' The relationship between the singlecrossing condition and the ranking of taxes by uniform progressivity is explained in section 3. Examples are given to suggest the usefulness of the concepts considered in the paper.
Single-crossing
We consider the comparison between two income taxes, TM and TL, the convention being that TM is more progressive than TL. Each 
In discussing the single-crossing condition it is helpful to distinguish between equal-yield and non-equal-yield comparisons.
'Although progressivity statements will be related only to the distribution of post-tax income, the arguments presented below are readily adapted for the purposes of an alternative approach, advocated by Kakwani (1977) , relating progressivity to the distribution of the tax burden. *We work in terms of weak Lorenz domination throughout the paper, and all subsequent references to Lorenz dominance are to be interpreted in that sense. It is straightforward, but cumbersome, to reformulate the discussion in terms of strict Lorenz domination.
Equal-yield comparisons
If G is such that TM and TL raise the same revenue, then
so that (1) reduces to the condition:
Denote by A(M, L) that subset of A for which (3) holds, i.e. the set of distributions of pre-tax income for which TM and T, raise the same revenue. Then:
Proposition I. TM is more progressive than T, VGE A(M, L) if and only if nM single-crosses nL on Y Pro05
(i) Sufficiency.
For v E [y, y*] (4) follows directly from the definition of single-crossing.
For v E [y*,>]:
from (3) and the definition of single-crossing.
(ii) Necessity. Suppose, for a contradiction, that nM and nL cross more than once on I: Then there exists at least one subinterval on which nM singlecrosses nL and at least one on which the reverse holds. By (i), it therefore suffices to show that if nM single-crosses rzL on any subinterval t of K then there exists G"EA such that TM and TL raise the same revenue on G'. This, however, follows readily from the assumed continuity of ni, i = L, M. The implication of proposition 1 is that if TM and TL are observed to raise the same revenue with nM single-crossing nL, then TM might reasonably be described as more progressive than TL given the underlying distribution of pre-tax income. Such a description has much intuitive appeal: relative to TL, TM increases the net income of all those with pre-tax income below a certain level whilst correspondingly reducing the net incomes of those with pre-tax income above that level, benefiting an identiliably 'poor' group at the expense of an identifiably 'rich' one. Conversely, if nM and nL cross more than
once, as in fig. 1 , then there exist distributions of pre-tax income across which the progressivity ranking is reversed. For any j~(yr, yz) there exist two distributions of pre-tax income, one confined to [y, j] and the other to [j, j], such that TM and TL raise the same revenue: but then TM is more progressive than TL for the former distribution and less progressive for the latter.
Non-equal-yield comparisons
In equal-yield comparisons the graphs of nM and n,_ must intersect. This need not be the case when the taxes under consideration raise different revenues. However, it is straightforward to extend the above argument to encompass non-equal-yield comparisons. We may rewrite (1) the condition for Lorenz domination of F, 1 G by
where denotes the share of total net income associated with pre-tax income y under T given that the distribution of pre-tax income is G. Thus, the tax schedules have been normalized in such a way that jn"(y)dG ( result also has substantial intuitive appeal: it is sufficient for TM to be more progressive for G than TL that there exist some level of pre-tax income such that the share in total net income of all those with incomes below (above) that level is higher (lower) under TM than under T,.
Now consider the problem of making progressivity comparisons between more than two tax schedules.
As is well known, single-crossing is not transitive (though it is acyclic). In the present context, however, the implications of this observation are limited, since Lorenz domination is transitive. Suppose, for instance, that n$ single-crosses n: and that n; singlecrosses ng. Then, although we cannot be sure that ng single-crosses ng, we may infer that F, 1 G Lorenz dominates F, 1 G and hence that TM is more progressive than TK for G. Thus, for a given distribution of pre-tax income, the single-crossing condition may be used to construct a partial ordering of tax systems by progressivity.
Single-crossing has received little attention, if any, in the progressivity literature.
We find this neglect surprising. The single-crossing condition described above is exceedingly straightforward. It enables quite powerful statements concerning the distributional implications of different tax systems to be made on the basis of information on tax schedule specifications and total net income alone. It would appear to be particularly valuable when income distribution data are incomplete or of low quality. Not least, singlecrossing seems to correspond closely to popular views on the nature and purpose of progressivity comparisons.
Single-crossing and uniform progressivity
We shall say that TM is 'uniformly more progressive' than T, if and only if F, 1 G Lorenz dominates F, 1 G VGEA. Thus TM is uniformly more progressive than TL if and only if it is more progressive than TL whatever the distribution of pre-tax income. Denote by 4i the elasticity of post-tax income with respect to pre-tax income under T; i.e. ~$~(y) = n;( y)y/ni(y), a prime indicating differentiation. 
by a piecewise linear one of the form:
Let G be such that the two taxes raise the same revenue, and suppose that 6, <t. Then it is easy to check that nz single-crosses n:. But it may also be verified that whilst &(y)< $~(y) for y~(a,j), 4M(y)> &(y) for y~(y, a). The approach suggested in this paper provides a useful framework for statements on relative progressivity in such cases as this: we may say that single-crossing of $ by PZ$ ensures that TM is more progressive than TL for G, although TM
is not uniformly more progressive than r,. In this way we can draw attention to the strong distributional implications of a switch from one tax to the other whilst emphasising that these implications are conditional upon a particular distribution of pre-tax income and are not intrinsic to the tax schedules themselves.
One other feature of this example may be noted. Jakobsson's proposition implies that the distribution of income above CI is more equal under T,, than under TL and that the reverse is true below c(. Indeed, it is clear that the 
Concluding remarks
This paper has described the use of a single-crossing condition in comparisons between tax systems. This condition corresponds precisely to the popular notion that an increase in progressivity involves taking from the rich to give to the poor in equal-yield comparisons. It has been shown that single-crossing is closely related to the necessary and sufficient condition, derived by Jakobsson, for the distributional implications of alternative taxes to be. inferred from tax schedules alone; that is, in the terminology suggested here, for taxes to be ranked by uniform progressivity.
We believe that the concepts discussed in this paper provide a useful framework for progressivity statements. Consider, for instance, the question: Is the current system of income taxation in the U.K. progressive? In terms of the standard definition of a 'progressive' tax as one whose average rate is everywhere increasing the answer is a firm 'No', for there is a narrow range of income -between the ceiling for National Insurance contributions and the lowest income on which income tax is levied at higher ratesover which the average rate falls. Nevertheless, the distribution of post-tax income Lorenz dominates that of pre-tax income, so that the distributional implications of the tax are, in practice, about as clear-cut as one can ever hope to find. Thus, although one might reasonably wish to characterize income taxation in the U.K. as progressive, it is impossible to justify doing so by referring to the standard definition alone. However, the dilemma is easily resolved by using the concepts discussed in this paper. Note first that the textbook definition of a progressive tax is precisely equivalent to the definition of such a tax as one that is uniformly more progressive than a proportional tax. Then the situation is fully described by saying that the U.K. income tax is more progressive than proportional taxation given the distribution of pre-tax income in the U.K., but is not uniformly so.
